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Abstract. In a world in which consumers correctly expect that both Ri-
cardian and non-Ricardian policy regimes are possible in the future, the
scal theory of the price level is valid, yet the price level is indeterminate.
This result does not rely on imposing that the initial stock of nominal
bonds be strictly positive, and it does not require a surprise ex post reval-
uation of nominal assets.
The scal theory of the price level has been much vilied. Some, like
Buiter (1999), have accused it of being logically inconsistent. More to the
point others, like Niepelt (2001), are worried that it might be a myth since
it relies on a strictly positive initial stock of nominal public debt that, pre-
sumably, Adam did not hold in the Garden of Eden.
Yet, asCochrane(2001)andothershaverepeatedlydemonstrated, thes-
caltheoryofthepricelevelhastheseductiveandrobustappealofsimplicity:
the government can rely on the ex post revaluation of its outstanding nom-
inal liabilities by the price level to nance its expenditure. The real value
of money (the inverse of the price level) is then is pinned down, in a non-
Ricardian regime, by the ratio of the expected present discounted value of
surpluses to the number of outstanding nominal bonds. As a result, the s-
cal theory of the price level provides a nominal anchor to the economy if the
nominal interest rate is pegged.
The difculty with this exposition of the scal theory is that it hinges,
as correctly pointed out by Niepelt (2001), explicitly on a positive initial
stock of nominal public debt, and implicity on performing a surprise policy
change in a perfect foresight framework. This is dangerous as it is seems
that the whole theory rests on a shaky foundation: a surprise, unexpected
ex post revaluation of nominal public debt held by the public.
I show in this paper, using a simple two-period model, that the scal
theory is alive and kicking, in the sense that it survives reformulation in
a rational expectations setup. Suppose agents correctly form expectations
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about future policy regimes (Ricardian or non-Ricardian). Then bondhold-
ers anticipate the revaluation of nominal debt that occurs in non-Ricardian
regimes. This inuences their demand for nominal debt and, as a result,
affects the equilibrium price level in the Ricardian regimes. Neither policy
surprises, nor a positive initial stock of nominal public debt is required for
the validity of scal theory.
However,Iestablishthatthepossibility,howeverminutebutcorrectlyan-
ticipated, that policy might be Ricardian in the future is enough to prevent
the scal theory of the price level from serving as a nominal anchor. To put
it simply, the price level in a non-Ricardian regime is the ratio of outstand-
ing nominal bonds to the the expected present discounted value of future
surplus. It is true that the former is predetermined, and that the latter can
be picked arbitrarily in a non-Ricardian regime. But it does not follow that
the price level is determinate, as the stock of outstanding nominal bonds is
itself indeterminate, as is the level of all prices in the economy.
I present in section 1 the two-period model used to make this points. In
section 2, I describe perfect foresight equilibria under Ricardian and non-
Ricardian regimes. I then turn, in section 3, to a world in which agents
correctlyperceiveintherstperiodthatscalpolicywillbeeitherRicardian
or non-Ricardian in the second period. The conclusion summarizes, and
outlines directions for further research.
1. A two-period model
1.1. Demographyandpreferences. ConsideraclosedFishereconomycom-
prised of a continuum of identical, two-period lived agents.
1 There are no
generations: all agents live simultaneously. Consumers are risk-neutral,
2
with subjective rate of time preference r.
1.2. Assets. The only outside asset circulating in the economy is nominal
debt, issued by the government at a nominal rate of interest which we as-
sume, for simplicity, to be pegged at zero. Nominal bonds are thus equiva-
lent to Samuelsonian moneyi.e., they are a pure store of value. As a short-
hand, I will often call these nominal bonds money. Note that since money
provides no transactions services, our monetary economy is frictionless, as
in Cochrane (1998).
The price of consumption in terms of money (inverse of the real price of
money) is p1 in the rst period, p2 in the second period. Since consumers
are risk neutral, it must be the case that, in equilibrium, the expected real
rate of return on money (i.e., the inverse of the ination rate) equals the
1The model is inspired by Bassetto (2001).
2The results of the paper would not be affected qualitatively by risk aversion.REFLECTIONS ON THE FTPL 3
required rate of return r:
E

p1
p2

= 1 + r; (1.1)
where E denotes expectation conditional on period 1 information.
1.3. Consumers'budgetconstraints. Consumersreceiveunproduced,and
non-storable endowments (manna from heaven) y1 in the rst period, and
y2 in the second period. Goods markets are competitive, so that consumers
take p1 and p2 as given.
Neglecting inside assets, which are not traded in equilibrium since all
agents are identical, the period budget constraints facing our consumers are
thus
p1c1 + M1 = p1y1   1 + M0; (1.2)
p2c2 + M2 = p2y2   2 + M1; (1.3)
where c and  stand for consumption and lump-sum taxes (in real terms),
M0  0 denotes given initial nominal money balances, and M1 and M2 are
the consumer's nominal money demand in periods 1 and 2.
Consumers are forbidden to die in debt, and they accordingly must en-
sure that M2  0. This solvency condition, along with the additional as-
sumption that consumers are never satiated, implies that consumers always
choose, in an optimal program, to satisfy the solvency condition with strict
equality:
M2 = 0: (1.4)
Were this transversality condition not satised, our consumer would either
die in debt or leave some of her lifetime resources uneatenwhich would
be either infeasible or suboptimal.
1.4. Government budget. In each period, the primary decit of the gov-
ernment must be nanced by seignorage (i.e., issuance of non-interest bear-
ing nominal debt). Let gt denote real government spending per capita3 in
period t, t 2 f1;2g, and call
st = t   gt
the real primary budget surplus (decit if negative). Then it must be true
that
M1   M0 =  p1s1; (1.5)
M2   M1 =  p2s2; (1.6)
3Assume that public consumption is either useless or enters the utility function
separably.4 P. WEIL
Given that consumers' money holdings in the nal period are zero by the
transversality condition (1.4), we can rewrite (1.6) as
M1 = p2s2: (1.7)
1.5. Equilibrium. Sincetheeconomyisclosedandthegoodisnon-storable,
privateconsumptionequalsoutputminuspublicconsumption. Inpercapita
terms, we must thus have
ct = yt   gt: (1.8)
for t 2 f1;2g.
2. Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes:
Perfect foresight
Let us use the foregoing model to highlight, as a starting point, the now
standard distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian policy regimes
in a deterministic setting with perfect foresight. In line with usual presenta-
tions of the scal theory of the price level, I rst consider the last period of
the model (period 2), taking as given the nominal money balances M1 car-
ried over into period 2 by our consumer. I then step back to the rst period
to explore the feasibility of non-Ricardian regimes when M1 is chosen by the
consumer.
2.1. Last period. Consider rst what happens in the last period, from the
perspective of which money holdings carried from the rst period (M1) are
predetermined.
2.1.1. Ricardian regime. In a Ricardian policy regime, the government -
nancing equation (1.7) is a constraint that must hold for all possible price
levels. Consequently, given M1, the second period budget surplus is deter-
mined by the necessity to satisfy (1.7) regardless of what p2 turns out to be.
This requires that
s2 = M1=p2: (2.1)
In a Ricardian regime, the real primary surplus must vary negatively with
the price level, to ensure that the nominal surplus be constant and equal to
the predetermined M1. Consequently, scal authorities must pay attention
to monetary policy (as summarized by the outstanding stock of nominal
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2.1.2. Non-Ricardianregime. Bycontrast,inanon-Ricardianpolicyregime,
the government nancing condition (1.7) is an equilibrium condition which
enables us to compute the compute the value of government liabilities given
the stock of outstanding liabilities M1 and the government real ability to re-
pay s2. With one less constraint on its behavior, the government can choose
any positive surplus s2 in period 2, and disregard M1. The price level simply
adjusts to determine p2. Solving (1.7) for p2 indeed yields
1=p2 = s2=M1: (2.2)
As pointed out eloquently by Cochrane (2001), the mechanism presiding to
the valuation nominal bonds is no different from the one that governs the
valuation of shares. Take the total stream per capita of dividends associ-
ated with the nominal bond (here, the surplus in period 2). Divide it by the
number of outstanding bonds per head (M1). The result is the real value
1=p2 of the nominal bond. Fiscal policy plays a central role, through the
government valuation equation (2.2), in the determination of the price
level. Non-Ricardian regimes are thus the foundation of the scal theory of
the price level.
It is noteworthy that non-Ricardian regimes are only feasible if M1 > 0.
This assumption is usually imposed without any ado by the exponents of
the scal theory of the price level,4 but its necessity reveals, as pointed out
forcefullybyNiepelt(2001),theeconomicphenomenonthatunderliesnon-
Ricardian regimes: the surprise revaluation of nominal assets in a perfect
foresight model. Let us retrace indeed the logic that led us to the valuation
equation (2.2):
(1) Theconsumers'transversalitycondition(1.4)mustbesatised. This
requires that the demand for nominal bonds be zero in the nal pe-
riod.
(2) By (1.6), the change in supply of nominal bonds equals the nominal
primary surplus in period 2.
(3) For an arbitrary real surplus (s2 > 0), these two conditions can be
satised at the same time if only if p2 adjusts to equate the real value
of outstanding bonds in period 2, M1=p2 to the arbitrary surplus
s2 > 0 set by scal authorities.
In more graphic terms, the surprise revaluation of outstanding nominal
bonds is an extra source of revenue for the government in a non-Ricardian
regime. As equation (2.2) shows, a the smaller the real surplus s2, the larger
p2 and the smaller the real value of outstanding nominal bonds.
4See, to name but a few, ?, Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), Cochrane (1998), or
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) or Woodford (1997).6 P. WEIL
The scal theory of the price level is thus not mystery some feel it is.
While it is correct to assert that what makes non-Ricardian regimes possible
is the transformation of (1.7) from a constraint that must hold for all price
levels into an equilibrium condition, this is not an exhaustive description
of the scal theory of the price level, as it is missing the crucial condition
that initial nominal government liabilities must be positive. The alternative
statement by Cochrane (2001) that the scal theory is at its core a valuation
equation for the government gets much closer to the point, but it is still too
discreet about the requirement that initial nominal liabilities be positive. A
less technical and more transparent exposition of the theory should simply
state that the extra freedom afforded to scal authorities in non-Ricardian
regimes comes from the ability of the government to alter the real value
of outstanding nominal assets. Accordingly, it becomes immediately clear
that this greater scal latitude vanishes, and only Ricardian regimes remain
feasible, should outstanding nominal assets happen to be zero in period 2
(M1 = 0).5
But what happens if consumers expect in period 1 the government to fol-
low a non-Ricardian policy in period 2? Will they refuse to hold nominal
debt?
2.2. First period. Up to now, we have limited ourselves to the last period,
taking M1 as given. But M1 is not exogenous, as it is determined by the
consumers' choice in the rst period. Does the analysis of the previous sub-
section survive the endogenous determination of M1? To answer this ques-
tion, I rst briey describe, for reference, intertemporal equilibrium under
a Ricardian policy regime. I then show that non-Ricardian regimes remain
possible as long as scal authorities can revalue an outstanding stock nomi-
nal assets in the rst period, i.e., if M0 > 0.
2.2.1. Ricardian regime. Remember that the nominal interest rate is pegged
to zero. I now replicate the standard result that the price level is indetermi-
nate under a Ricardian regime.
Intertemporal optimality require that equilibrium prices satisfy the arbi-
trage condition (1.1). Since there is no uncertainty, it must be the case that
p1=p2 = (1 + r): (2.3)
Thisisadifferenceequationinthepricelevel, butthereisnoboundarycon-
dition to tie its solution down to a unique equilibrium. To check this is true,
pick any p1 > 0. Given this p1, the arbitrage condition (2.3) determines p2.
Now, for a given rst-period budget surplus s1, the rst period government
5This point is made more formally and more generally in proposition 3 of Niepelt
(2001).REFLECTIONS ON THE FTPL 7
budget constraint gives us in turn M1 as a function of p1. Finally, once scal
authorities have chosen s1, they have no latitude left to pick s2: they must
satisfy (2.1).6
Let us summarize. First, the price level is indeterminate: any p1 > 0 is
an equilibrium. Second, combining equations (2.3), (1.5) and (1.7), scal
policy is bound, for any p1 and thus for any p2, by the intertemporal budget
constraint
M0
p1
= s1 +
s2
1 + r
: (2.4)
Whatever the price level and initial nominal debt, scal authorities must
make sure their sequence of surpluses equalizes their real ability to repay
public debt (the righthand side of (2.4)) with the real value of outstanding
initial debt. The real surpluses s1 and s2 cannot be chosen independently of
each other, and of the price level.
2.2.2. Non-Ricardian regimes. The previous conclusions need not hold if
there is some outstanding nominal debt that can be revalued in the rst
period.
Take any xed s1 and s2.7 Combining (1.5) with the second period valu-
ation equation (2.2), and using the arbitrage condition (2.3), we get
1
p1
=
s1 + s2=(1 + r)
M0
: (2.5)
This expression is the rst-period counterpart of the second-period valu-
ation equation (2.2): the real value of a unit of money in period 1 equals
the ratio of the real present discounted value of budget surpluses (the ability
to repay, or dividends distributed by government) to the number of out-
standing nominal liabilities. The initial price level is thus determinate in a
non-Ricardian regime, because it is pinned down by scal policy through
the equilibrium valuation equation.8 In other terms, the scal theory of the
price level provides a nominal anchor in the presence of a nominal interest
peg.
Theseresultspointout,onceagain,theessentialroleplayedbyassetreval-
uation. OnlyifM0 > 0arenon-Ricardianregimespossible; canbudgetsur-
pluses be chosen arbitrarily and independently of each other;9 and can the
6I could have of course reversed the course of events, and shown that, for each p1, there
is only one value of s1 possible once s2 is chosen.
7There are other types on non-Ricardian policies. I focus here on the simplest, as do, for
instance, Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999).
8Note also that the economic interpretation of expressions (2.4) and (2.5) is quite dif-
ferent, although they are look mathematically identical. The former is a constraint, while
the latter is an equilibrium condition.
9The only constraints are that p1 and p2 must remain positive.8 P. WEIL
price level be determinate in spite of the nominal interest rate peg. By back-
ward recursion, the same results hold regardless of the number of periods,
and in the limit when horizons are innite.
2.3. So what? None of what I have done so far is novel: both proponents
and opponents of the scal theory of the price level are aware that the initial
stock of outstanding nominal liabilities held by the public must be initially
be positive for non-Ricardian regimes to be possible. Where they differ is
in the what they deal with this necessity of asset revaluation in the initial
period.
2.3.1. Proponents. Proponentsofthescaltheoryimplicitlydonotviewthe
initial period as the literal beginning of time. They understand, for sure,
that Adam did not nd nominal government bonds lying on the ground in
the Garden of Eden. Rather, they think of the initial period as today, or
some arbitrary reference date, and ask: given the predetermined stock of
outstanding nominal assets held by households today, can the government
freely pick its future surpluses?
The methodological difculty with this question is that it examines what
the effect of a surprise policy change is in a perfect foresight world. In a
perfect foresight world, initial money balances M0 are based on the exact
knowledge by households before period 1 of what scal policy is in period
1 and beyond. Exploring, as we have done above, whether scal author-
ities can pick by surprise, in periods 1 and 2, arbitrary budget surpluses
that differ from the consumers' previous point forecasts is a perilous exer-
cise, as its conclusions rely, through M0, on the very approximation we are
making! We are indeed ignoring, when we study a surprise policy change
is in a perfect foresight world, that consumers are not truly surprised, that
they form probability distributions over future scal policy, and that M0
in reality reects these expectations of future scal policy. Hypotheses and
approximations are acceptable as long as they are orthogonal to the issue
we are studying. But in the case of the scal theory of the price level, this
epistemological principle is violated, as the very existence non-Ricardian
regimes rests on the possibility and magnitude of asset revaluation. Thus,
the essential role played by the condition M0 > 0 should be a warning light
that something is wrong with traditional presentations of the scal theory
of the price level. This condition should not be crucial were this theory only
about transforming the intertemporal budget equation of the government
from a constraint into a equilibrium condition, or about valuing money as
a stock, to use the title of Cochrane's (2001) superb paper.
2.3.2. Opponents. Opponents of the scal theory of the price level, most
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which case it must be true that M0 = 0. Niepelt (2001) concludes, in line
withthepredictionsofoursimplemodel,thatnon-Ricardianpolicyregimes
do not exist generically (proposition 4) when M0 = 0, and that Non-
Ricardian policies are not feasible because households cannot be cheated
or forced to hold government debt if they must expect the latter to yield
returns below the market clearing level (p. 12).
2.3.3. Is there a middle ground? Proponents of the scal theory of the price
level are undeniably correct when they (implicitly) tell us not to take the
rst period too literally as the origin of time. For this reason, we should
not use the results of this section, or of Niepelt (2001), to condemn the
scal theory of the price level to death here and now. There is indeed a
reasonable doubt: we still do not know whether the scal theory of the price
level survives, and if it does in which form, once we abandon the convenient
but perilous framework of policy surprises in a perfect foresight world, and
analyze instead the feasibility of non-Ricardian regimes in a world in which
consumers are not cheated, and form expectations of future policies.
3. Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes:
Policy expectations
I now examine, in the simple two-period model of section 1, what hap-
pens when consumers understand in period 1 that scal authorities may
follow either Ricardian or non-Ricardian policies in the second period.10 I
still take as given initial nominal bond holdings M0, but I will show that
nothing depends qualitatively in equilibrium on whether M0 is positive or
zero, in stark contrast with the perfect foresight equilibria with surprises
described in the previous section.
Fix without loss of generality the rst period budget surplus s1. Assume
that it is known in period 1 that scal authorities will follow in period 2 ei-
ther a Ricardian scal policy with probability , or a non-Ricardian policy
with probability 1   , with 0    1. To describe the resulting equilib-
rium (or, rather, as we will see equilibria), I proceed backwards in time, as
in section 2.
3.1. Lastperiod. Since the second period is the last one, there is no further
uncertainty left at t = 2, and the results of perfect foresight accordingly
apply to the last period.
If scal authorities follows a Ricardian policy , the second period surplus
in the Ricardian case must be, from (2.1),
s
R
2 = M1=p
R
2 ; (3.1)
10This scenario is meant to capture in a quick (but not so dirty) way the long run sto-
chastic equilibrium of an economy with scal policy regime switches.10 P. WEIL
with M1 being, as before, the predetermined outstanding stock of nominal
bonds in the second period, and pR
2 denoting the price level in the second
period if a Ricardian policy is followed.
On the other hand, in a non-Ricardian regime, scal authorities pick an
arbitrary second period primary surplus sNR
2 , in which case the price level
is the second period is scally determined and equals
p
NR
2 = M1=s
NR
2 : (3.2)
I assume, to simplify, that consumers know in advance which arbitrary sNR
2
scal authorities will pick in the second period should they follow a non-
Ricardian policy. What matters is that this sNR
2 is xed in real, not nom-
inal, terms.11 What we still do not know, and must nd out, is whether
the condition M0 > 0 is still needed to enable the government to pick sNR
2
independently of s1.
3.2. Firstperiod. Intertemporaloptimalityrequiresthatthearbitragecon-
dition (1.1) be satised. As a result, equilibrium prices must satisfy

p1
pR
2
+ (1   )
p1
pNR
2
= 1 + r: (3.3)
This is a stochastic difference equation in prices today and tomorrow but
I now show that its solution is indeterminate as long as  > 0 and sR
2 is
endogenous as specied in (3.1).
The proof parallels the one used to establish indeterminacy in the perfect
foresight case. Pick any p1 > 0. Given M0 and s1, the rst-period govern-
mentbudgetconstraint(1.5)enablesustocomputeM1. OnceweknowM1,
the valuation equation (3.2) gives us pNR
2 , the price level in a second period
in a non-Ricardian regime. We can then solve the arbitrage equation (3.3)
for pR
2 , the price level in the Ricardian regime. Finally, the second period
government budget constraint in the Ricardian regime, (3.1), provides us
with sR
2 , the (endogenous) second period surplus in the Ricardian regime.
Formally, the solution is parameterized by the indeterminate p1. Given s1
and sNR
2 , it can be written recursively as follows:12
M1 = M0   p1s1;
p
NR
2 = M1=s
NR
2 ;
1=p
R
2 = (1 + r)=(p1)   (1   )=(p
NR
2 );
s
R
2 = M1=p
R
2 :
11Letting, in addition, consumers form expectations on sNR
2 would uselessly complicate
matter, and not be very convincing anyway since the scal theory of the price level has no
theory of optimal public spending or taxation to present.
12Some equations that appear earlier are reproduced here for clarity.REFLECTIONS ON THE FTPL 11
Straightforward combination of these equations implies
M0
p1
= s1 +
sR
2 + (1   )sNR
2
1 + r
: (3.4)
Contrary to what happens in the non-Ricardian perfect foresight case, this
expression does not yield, regardless of the value of M0, a determinate solu-
tionfortheinitialpricelevelp1 becausesR
2 isendogenous. Instead,equation
(3.4) holds given any M0 and for any p1, and it determines sR
2 as a function
of these variables. Thus, in spite of the feasibility of non-Ricardian regimes
in some states, an intertemporal budget constraint binds the actions of the
government in Ricardian regimes, and the price level is indeterminate. The
scal theory of the price level holds in some states, but it is not enough to
provide a nominal anchor.
Theonlytwowaystoavoidindeterminacywouldbetoassumethat = 0,
or that (contrary to what we have assumed) sR
2 is xed. The former case is
one in which agents place literally a zero probability on the future emer-
gence of a Ricardian regime. The latter case unacceptably labels as Ricar-
dian a regime which is really non-Ricardian.13 We must thus conclude that
any positive, however small, possibility of a switch to a Ricardian regime
reestablishes price level indeterminacy.
Remarkably, this indeterminacy is perfectly consistent with the scal de-
termination of the price level in states of nature in which policy is non-
Ricardian. A careful examination of the valuation equation (3.2) reveals
that the price level pNR
2 depends on scal policy through sNR
2 , but that the
stock of outstanding nominal liabilities is itself indeterminate, as it depends
on M1 which depends in turn on the indeterminate p1.14
Last, but not least, the operation of the non-Ricardian regime in the sec-
ond period does not require anymore a surprise revaluation of nominal as-
sets. Quite the contrary. Pick an arbitrary p1, and imagine for instance that
sNR
2 is very small. Consumers understand that, as a result of the scal the-
ory, the price level pN
2 R will be high in the non-Ricardian state (equation
12). But arbitrage then imposes that pR
2 be small (equation 12). Therefore,
ahighrealrateofreturnonnominalbondsisrequiredintheRicardianstate
to compensate investors for the low real return in the non-Ricardian state.
I summarize the results of the paper into the following
13In both cases, we obtain the perfect foresight non-Ricardian equilibrium described in
section 2, whose existence depends on the condition M0 > 0.
14To ensure that non-Ricardian regimes are possible in the second period, I impose that
p1, s1 and M0 jointly satisfy M0   p1s1 > 0, which guarantees that M1 > 0.12 P. WEIL
Proposition. Suppose there is a probability  that future policy will be Ricar-
dian, and a probability 1    that it will be non-Ricardian. Let M0 denote
initial money balances. Assume the nominal interest rate is pegged.
A.If > 0, then1)anequilibriumexistsregardlessofthevalueoftheinitial
money stock M0, 2) the price level is indeterminate, and 3) the price level in
the non-Ricardian state is scally determined, yet indeterminate.
B. If  = 0, then 1) non-Ricardian regimes are feasible if and only if M0 >
0, and 2) the price level is scally determined, and determinate.
C. If  = 1, then 1) Ricardian regimes are feasible regardless of the value of
M0, and 2) the price level is indeterminate.
We can place high condence in parts A and C of this proposition, since
neither requires M0 > 0. Asset revaluation is not needed for parts A and
C to obtain, as they follow through even if M0 = 0. However, we should
view part B with great suspicion, since it entirely rests, as noted earlier, on
the dubious foundation of a surprise revaluation of assets in a perfect fore-
sight model. Indeed, the requirement that M0 be positive for part B of the
propositiontoobtainappearsalmostoxymoronic. ConsumerspickM0 > 0
voluntarily only if they are surprised, and do not realize that scal author-
ities will nance, say, a primary in period 1 by devaluing nominal assets in
period 2. Founding the results in part B on an assumption so blatantly in
contradiction with the starting point of perfect foresight ( = 0) is, too
put it mildly, perilous. In other terms, what we have here is one of those
rare cases in which looking at policy surprises in a perfect foresight world
(instead of specifying that consumers face a distribution of future policies)
gives us a misleading answer by letting us make a simplifying assumption
that is not orthogonal to the issue under consideration. We are on solid
ground, however, as soon as we specify that agents form rational expecta-
tions about the distribution of future policy regimes (part A). Fiscal policy
is non-Ricardian in some states; yet the price level is indeterminate.
Cushing (1999, p. 147) had already warned us, in a setting quite different
fromthisone, thatnon-Ricardianregimesdonotprovideanominalanchor
[o]nce agents are allowed to expect (rationally) that debt will not converge
under a non-Ricardian scal regime. The results of this paper tell us that
his warning should be heeded more generally.
4. Conclusion
This paper does not invalidate the scal theory of the price level. Non-
Ricardian scal regimes are possible, and in that respect Cochrane (1998,
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of the price level, are denitely innocent of the charge of logical inconsis-
tency sometimes levied against them.15 However, their argument that scal
determination of the price level implies price level determinacy in spite of
the peg of the nominal interest rate is in generically incorrect. The reason is
that the stock of nominal assets is itself in general indeterminate.
Niepelt (2001) is right to point out that the scal theory does not sur-
vive the (reasonable) assumption that should be M0 under perfect foresight
of non-Ricardian regime. Yet his argument that this is the end of the scal
theory of the price level as we know it is incorrect, for the very same rea-
son Cochrane and Woodford are partially wrong. Provided 0 <  < 1,
non-Ricardian regimes are feasible; they are associated in some states of na-
ture with a scal determination of the price level; yet the price level remains
indeterminate under a nominal interest rate peg because the stock of out-
standing nominal assets is indeterminate.
In short, this paper should be viewed as reconciling (hopefully) propo-
nents and opponents of the scal theory of the price level.
As usual, much remains to be done. Policy regimes could be made en-
dogenous, but this has more to do with the theory of optimal spending and
taxationthanwiththescaltheoryofthepricelevelperse. Themodelcould
be extended to richer environments: non-frictionless view of money, neo-
classical production rather than manna, productivity shocks, tastes shocks,
richermaturityofpublicdebt,consumersaversetouctuationofconsump-
tion over states and/or dates, many periods, overlapping generations etc.
The results will undoubtedly change, but the basic message will remain the
same: non-Ricardian regimes are possible, but the possibility of Ricardian
regimes,howeversmallitis,isenoughtomakethepricelevelindeterminate.
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